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Abstract
Archives are primary sources of information for biographers, historians and social
scientists. Yet the question about archives is how much information we overlook
or transform: fiction and facts often interplay. We pinned a related question
about the moral lesson present or not in archives. Do annals, chronicles, or
histories settle or merely end accounts? Coupling authority and moral lesson in
texts provides a way of linking archives of different degrees of accuracy: annals,
chronicles, and histories. We identified the same series of events covered on
three supports, as tapes, as memoir, and as film. The events in question concern
the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. We ran a computer-aided content
analysis of these textual data and used words into assessing, first, the risk of
conflict in the data, then the mood present in the data. Pure archives, such as
tapes, do not succeed in reenacting nonverbal events. It is as if only fiction or
imagination, in chronicles or stories, co...
Document type : Article de périodique (Journal article)
Référence bibliographique
Hogenraad, Robert. The fetish of archives.  In: Quality and Quantity : international journal of
methodology, Vol. 48, no. 1, p. 425-437 (2014)
DOI : 10.1007/s11135-012-9778-0
Quality & Quantity
 
The fetish of archives Robert L. Hogenraad Psychology Department Université
catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium _________________  Affiliation and
addresses: IPSY - Institute of Psychological Sciences, Université catholique de
Louvain, SSH/PSP, Michotte/Socrate/Mercier, Place du Cardinal Mercier 10, bte
L3.05.01, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. E-mail: robert.hogenraad@uclouvain.be.
Home: Ave Constant Montald, B-1200-Brussels. Ph & Fax: +3227632012
--Manuscript Draft--
 
Manuscript Number:
Full Title: The fetish of archives Robert L. Hogenraad Psychology Department Université
catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium _________________  Affiliation and
addresses: IPSY - Institute of Psychological Sciences, Université catholique de
Louvain, SSH/PSP, Michotte/Socrate/Mercier, Place du Cardinal Mercier 10, bte
L3.05.01, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. E-mail: robert.hogenraad@uclouvain.be.
Home: Ave Constant Montald, B-1200-Brussels. Ph & Fax: +3227632012
Article Type: Original paper
Keywords: annals, chronicles, histories;  computer-aided content analysis;  Cuban Missile Crisis;
motive imagery;  shortcomings in archives
Corresponding Author: Robert L. Hogenraad, PhD, Habil
Université catholique de Louvain
Louvain-la-Neuve, BELGIUM
Corresponding Author Secondary
Information:
Corresponding Author's Institution: Université catholique de Louvain
Corresponding Author's Secondary
Institution:
First Author: Robert L. Hogenraad, PhD, Habil
First Author Secondary Information:
Order of Authors: Robert L. Hogenraad, PhD, Habil
Order of Authors Secondary Information:
Abstract: Archives are primary sources of information for biographers, historians and social
scientists. Yet the question about archives is how much information we overlook or
transform: Fiction and facts often interplay. We pinned a related question about the
moral lesson present or not in archives. Do annals, chronicles, or histories settle or
merely end accounts? Coupling authority and moral lesson in texts provides a way of
linking archives of different degrees of accuracy: annals, chronicles, and histories. We
identified the same series of events covered on three supports, as tapes, as memoir,
and as film. The events in question concern the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.
We ran a computer-aided content analysis of these textual data and used words into
assessing, first, the risk of conflict in the data, then the mood present in the data. Pure
archives, such as tapes, do not succeed in reenacting nonverbal events. It is as if only
fiction or imagination, in chronicles or stories, could do justice to a 3-D reality and allow
it to become history by naturalizing that reality.
Suggested Reviewers: Andrew Wilson, PhD.
Prof., Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YT, United Kingdom
eiaaw@exchange.lancs.ac.uk
AW is familiar with computer-aided content analysis and the treatment of large corpora.
Luc Herman, PhD.
Prof., Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium
luc.herman@ua.ac.be
Because of his professional interests in English literature,he might be responsive to the
literary quality of different types of textual data. Actually, he himself suggested to me to
Powered by Editorial Manager® and Preprint Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
analyze the film script as described in the manuscript
Yves Bestgen, PhD.
Prof., Université catholique de Louvain
yves.bestgen@uclouvain.be
YB is familiar with quantitative treatment of textual data. he is also associated with the
Dep. of Linguistics of the University
Powered by Editorial Manager® and Preprint Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
The fetish of archives 
 
The failing of archives against imaginative truth 
 Archives are the territory of biographers, historians and social scientists and often their 
primary sources of information. It would be to the benefit of these text analysts to see if we can 
add some information to what we already know about them. Archives are a miniature of reality. 
They create memories while registering them on some external support (Derrida, 1998, p. 34 of 
the original French edition) (see also Steedman, 2001, 2002; Stewart, 1993; Wehler, 1980). 
Archives have had the reputation among social scientists akin to that of the philosopher‟s stone 
among alchemists. We question archives as reliable miniatures of reality. On one hand, there is a 
discreet assumption that archives contain the primitive text that, alone, clarifies reality, which 
Derrida dubbed the “archive fever”. We expect archives to be unambiguous and unsoiled, almost 
pharmaceutical. We expect archives to carry with them the full meaning of reality. On another 
hand, to state that expectation this baldly is to misrepresent that their trails might not be without 
breaks. “Our capacity for overlooking is virtually unlimited” writes Nelson Goodman (1978, p. 
14). Lewis‟ (1966) fiction “A small war made to order” is about the April 1961 „Bay of Pigs‟ 
failed invasion. At one point in the story, CIA man Peake ominously tells his boss Berry “We 
seem to be depending these days for our information entirely on the stuff given us by the exile 
groups. Most of it‟s years out of date” (p. 13). Ambiguities veil documents, and so do 
euphemisms, self-censorship, and interpolations (Buranov, 1994; Combe, 2001). 
 Another way of looking at archives touches on the inseparability of history and historical 
fiction (Davis, 1987). The story of Elizabeth Gaskell‟s (2006) “Mary Barton” for example is 
secondary to the sociological analysis of class conflicts and their associated poverty and class 
injustice. Reading history is not independent of the memories of the reader. But then there is the 
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other apprehension that archives might also be shorn of clairvoyance. Sometimes mere factual 
accurate reportage of an event is unable to suggest its deep sense, where some licence would 
give a better clue of the experience of the event. “Narratives may be the last resort of economic 
theorists. But they are probably the life stuff of those whose behavior they study” (Bruner, 1986, 
p. 43) (see also Spence, 1982; White, 1980). Primo Levi‟s (2001) account of Auschwitz does 
probably more to help us become aware of the experience of the camps than the vast 
historiography on them. Some novelists come closer than biographers at that. In her biography of 
Henry James, Lyndall Gordon (1998) has it that “everything in James (…) suggests that 
documentary truth is limited and needs the complement of imaginative truth” (p. 370). This was 
a craft the same Henry James (2005) was good at, as when, in his autobiography, he deliberately 
converted some of the letters of his brother William into a family story as all his truth (Poirier, 
2002). The good news is then to learn from Black (1984, p. 235) that stories describe a slice of a 
fictional world that is similar in most respect to the real world. We can efficiently use stories to 
reach the real world. 
Dust of war 
 Our present hypothesis is that people recount events in archives while adding in 
chronicles and stories an elusive tone which we contrive to make visible here. To illustrate and to 
crash-test the difference between archives, chronicles, and stories, we need to find the same 
events reported in archives, chronicles, and stories as sounding boards of archives. We found 
such events in three styles of reports about the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and 
collated them (Table 1). The Cuban Missile Crisis erupted on September 16, 1962. The United 
States had discovered, from the analysis of U2 recon aerial photographs, the presence of nuclear 
missiles the Soviet Union was installing in San Cristobal, western Cuba, just 90 miles off the US 
coast. Several documents, fictions, movies, and psychological, historical, Kremlinological, and 
political studies, report on and analyzed these events (Blight, 1987; Blight, 1990; Blight & 
Welch, 1989; Costigliola, 1995; Guttieri, Wallace, & Suedfeld, 1995; Marfleet, 2000; 
Troyanovsky, 1992; Winter, 1993, 2003). (1) Among the most undistorted archives are the taped 
conversations held by President Kennedy‟s Executive Committee (EXCOMM) from October 16, 
11:50 am to October 29, 10:10 am (May & Zelikow, 1997). (2) Next comes Robert F. Kennedy‟s 
memoir “Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis” (1969). This is the recount 
anchored in reality –partly based on the tapes-- of the events as experienced close from within by 
the brother of the President, not at a historian‟s distance. (3) Most glamorized, yet still relying in 
part on the tapes, is David Self‟s (2000) movie script. We compare the three series of documents 
to trail the risk of confrontation during this crisis. We want to know which of the traces of those 
events, that is, the tapes, the memoir, or the film script as imagined miniature of that reality, 
translates the richest information and does justice to the life experience of these events.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
Using words of war into detecting a risk of war: The motivational root of conflict and a 
measuring instrument 
  Conflicts are complex and their origin involves many uncontrollable conditions. To 
analyze how nations develop patterns of violence over time invites to turn to historical 
observations. The ground of McClelland‟s construct (1975, pp. 314-359) is his observation that, 
in history, the reformist zeal of visionary and bullying moralism is often the link –not to confuse 
with the cause-- between an imperial motivation pattern (measured by the spread created 
between high need for power and low need for affiliation) and later wars. Consider President 
Harry S. Truman‟s (1947) “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures”. This aura runs like a recurring theme through many conflicts, an axiom it would be 
useful to break the code of. Another example is Leffler‟s (2007) book title “For the soul of 
mankind”, which fleshes out the role of moral conviction at the origin of the Cold War.  
In McClelland‟s model of the root of conflicts, the need for affiliation refers to the 
uncomplicated traffic of shared love. The need for power refers to the need to get control over 
people. Affiliation and power are often in disagreement: The crest of one then coincides with the 
troughs of the other, spreading a pattern of conflict or appeasement depending on the momentum 
of each need. We best understand affiliation and power by contrast with what each is not for the 
other. One cannot love and be in control of the other. That would be like looking after a robot, 
predictable and tractable. The complexity to make up power and affiliation with each other also 
matches Robert Reich‟s (2001, 2007) argument that it is difficult for capitalist power not to 
sacrifice solidarity and loyalty. Each need serves as ballast for the other.  
 We turned McClelland‟s view of the motivational root of conflicts into a tool to assess 
them in continuous texts, and used a procedure that guarantees the same treatment for each 
document. We draw on words of affiliation and words of power to build up a “motive 
dictionary” that works as a semantic filter (Table 2). We then measure the gap between the 
relative frequency of power words and the relative frequency of affiliation words. The wider the 
gap, the greater the risk of conflict. A persistent upward trend in the “Power-minus-Affiliation” 
gap is a warning that a conflict is becoming more likely, while the trapped sounds of war are still 
hardly audible. It is not a magic formula for identifying a point at which one can say “The war 
starts tomorrow”. There is a difference between predicting the factual outbreak of a conflict and 
getting intelligence that a conflict is becoming more likely. Wars, like earthquakes, are complex 
and open-ended. Likelihood does not exclude randomness and models that explain too much end 
explaining little (Bruner, 1986, p. 4). To assess the likelihood of an event is to admit that you 
cannot know for sure whether it will take place. Imponderable events like idiosyncratic bias of 
political decision-makers blur geostrategic logic. Models always contain some glitches, 
otherwise we would talk of reality. The favored coordinated arrangement proposed here 
concentrates on McClelland‟s motivational model that, in the specific context of conflicts, has 
persuasive insights for predicting the outbreak of wars or the coming of peace. Detecting the 
likelihood of a conflict provides the information which would make possible to evaluate its risk. 
Knowledge of that risk leads naturally to the possibility to prefigure it. In the present analysis, 
we expect the EXCOMM tapes to stick to the facts and show the decrease in the risk of conflict 
over the days of the crisis as we know from history. We expect Robert Kennedy to keep his 
memoir also close to the facts of history, while remaining careful to prove the clear-sightedness 
of his brother President in carrying out the best solution to avoid a generalized nuclear conflict. 
David Self‟s movie script is where we expect most divergences from the facts as this is where 
imagination is free to take precedence over the facts.  
Moral lessons in tapes, memoir, and script 
 Do the tapes, memoir, or script offer moral lessons to learn from the October 1962 
events? This is our collateral question. The signal of such lessons should be an overall higher 
rate of abstract thinking in the content of whichever document. Martindale‟s (1975) Regressive 
Imagery Dictionary (RID) rests on two types of thought contents, the primordial (concrete) ones 
and the conceptual (abstract) ones. Using the conceptual thought contents of the RID gives us the 
opportunity to dig into the question. We expect to find more conceptual thought contents in the 
film script, some in the memoir, and least in the tapes, in proportion to the degree of creative 
freedom enjoyed in each medium. 
  
Method 
Data  
 The first document comes from the transcripts of the tapes of the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis. President Kennedy‟s Executive Committee (EXCOMM) held these conversations from 
October 16, 11:50 am to October 29, 10:10 am (May & Zelikow, 1997). We periodized the tapes 
in days. The EXCOMM held no meeting on Wednesday October 17 and on Sundays 21 and 28. 
We divided the second document, the memoir of Robert Kennedy (1969), into 32 arbitrary units 
of 513 words each. This is because the 12 chapters of the memoir did not match each day of the 
crisis. Finally we periodized the third document, David Self‟s (2000) film script “Thirteen 
Days”, in the 13 days of the crisis, October 16 to 28. Films have more flexibility than written 
texts. So, we marked separately the talks and the settings. Written documents are necessarily 
sequential while pictures and film script enjoy a certain degree of creative ubiquity, using the 
voice-over technique for example. 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
Computer-aided content analysis and dictionaries 
We enter the texts in their natural order, with codes to slice the text, and maneuver the 
PROTAN procedure (Hogenraad, Daubies, Bestgen, & Mahau, 1995), to act on the data. Content 
analysis involves entering, pruning, and arranging texts into frequency tables. Pruning brings 
down the number of different word entries of some degree. We trim words by comparing the 
texts to a list of standard transformations; for example by cutting down text entries eaten, eats, or 
eating-room to the single entry eat. We then look for matches between words in a dictionary 
(Table 2) and words in the text. A dictionary, in content analysis, is a treasury of words with a 
role in a screening hierarchy. Filtering out allows us to cut out only what we are looking for. We 
then shove the text words into these cut-outs, count the number of word matches in each cut-out 
and take the percentage of matches. 
 A database of needs, the motive dictionary comprises 843 and 1769 entries (English 
words and root words) respectively for the affiliation and power categories; we did not use the 
“need of achievement” part of the motive dictionary. Versions of the dictionary exist also for the 
French and the Spanish (Table 3). To test the truth of McClelland‟s insight, and the power of the 
dictionary, we analyzed stories and real-life documents describing emerging conflicts (to this 
day, 36 corpuses totaling 4,169,687 words) (Note 1). Among such tests, we codified diplomatic 
archives of the period preceding the outbreak of World War I and II and of other low-intensity 
conflicts (Hogenraad, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008; Hogenraad & Garagozov, 2010). The analyses 
allowed us to confirm that it was possible to assess how likely it was for these conflicts to break 
out over time. For example, we analyzed the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq through the 
speeches of President Georges W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair from September 11, 2001 
to March 20, 2003 (Hogenraad, 2005). We also analyzed the preludes to the confrontation 
between Georgia and the Russian Army of August 2008 (Hogenraad & Garagozov, 2010). We 
showed that, over the year 2008, the risk of conflict was increasing in the statements of President 
Medvedev of Russia. But the risk of conflict was decreasing in the statements of President 
Saakashvili of Georgia. We presumed the latter preferred to avoid a direct confrontation with the 
Russian Army. In each case, an increase of the gap combining the two needs, affiliation and 
power, was a better predictor than either of the two needs taken separately. Others have tested 
the imagery motive model as well, like Chung and Pennebaker‟s (2011) review of the usefulness 
of the motive imagery to analyze threat communications. Using trained scorers, Smith (2008) 
found more power imagery motives in terrorist groups than in non-terrorist groups. Frisch (2010) 
found that both integrative complexity (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977) and motive imagery measures 
were in accordance to predict hostile intents of the actors of the August 2008 Russian 
intervention in Georgia. There are also measures of affiliation and power to explore the First 
Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords of 1993 (Tripscha, Donohue, & Druckman, 2006). Finally, 
Schultheiss (2008) presents a thorough review of the physiological, behavioral, social, economic, 
and historical correlates, including wars, of major implicit motives. This is why this database of 
needs makes a powerful way to work. Yet, are not conflicts too complicated and raw to be easily 
shaped economically into the simplest psychological terms? Every model assuredly exaggerates. 
But only exaggeration makes visible what otherwise would lie unseen in the ordinariness of the 
everyday life. Besides, models and theories change, methods do not, or less. Technically 
speaking, the many tests on this marker of the risk of war are not experimental, simply because 
most of these experiments work. And because these experiments coexist with a close awareness 
of some of the composites of the chemistry of war.  
In the English version of the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (RID), 1,815 entries make 
up the primordial thought contents and 668 the conceptual thought ones (Note 2).The latter split 
into subcategories of “abstract thought”, “social behavior”, “instrumental behavior”, “restraint”, 
“order”, “temporal referents”, and “moral imperative”. The RID rests on the notion that one can 
arrange thought and language according to whether they point to dream and reality or to symbols 
and abstract thinking. Primordial thinking is that quality of thought in which there is a 
predominance of images over abstract thoughts; it is also the form of thought that comes first --
so the label "primordial"-- in the developing child (Klinger, 1971, p. 41). Conceptual thinking 
stresses logical continuity and awareness of relations. Martindale (1990) described and 
summarized tests of the validity of the RID while Wilson (2011) analyzed the concurrent validity 
of its English, German, Latin, and Portuguese versions.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Results 
Results integrate statistical treatments like (1) removing autocorrelations and (2) 
resampling statistics. (1) It is impossible to randomize textual data because the temporal order is 
part of the information carried by them. Texts follow their marching orders! For example, the 
rate of “need for power” on October 22 in the EXCOMM tapes may depend to some degree on 
its rate the day before. When such a dependency becomes systematic, it creates a seeming 
change without any genuine change. A systematic dependency in a temporal series is an 
autocorrelation. We calculate and remove such dependencies from serial data and regress the 
variable over the series (Hogenraad, McKenzie, & Martindale, 1997). (2) In its March 19, 2008 
“News and features” series, the Lloyds insurance company (Thomas, 2008, p. 1) announced that 
“a Dutch wine maker has insured his nose for €5m to cover against any accident that could 
threaten his livelihood”. Insurance companies and textual studies both have to deal with 
unrepeatable events, sometimes for the first ones, most of the time for the second ones. Actuarial 
statistics rely on large samples of events, unavailable for noses. Textual works too are unique. 
We used technique of resampling statistics (Diaconis & Efron, 1983; Péladeau, 1996; Roberts & 
Fan, 2004) to capture the confidence region of the parameter values of unique textual data 
(Shalizi, 2010). We treat the scores of each variable of interest, say the rate of “need for power” 
in the tapes, as if they were the population, and recreate several thousands samples from it by 
sampling with replacement (Hogenraad & McKenzie, 1999).  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Words of peace, deeds of war, and moral lesson 
 The EXCOMM tapes show a significantly linear decreasing risk of confrontation, that is, 
a narrowing gap between affiliation and power [R² = .42, F(1, 9) = 6.5, p < .05] (Table 4 and 
Figure 1). Robert Kennedy‟s memoir too shows a decreasing risk of confrontation [R² = .24, F(1, 
30) = 9.4, p < .005] (Table 4 and Figure 2). Winter (1993, p. 540) had already noted this decrease 
of the gap between affiliation and power in the US-Soviet communications during the Cuban 
crisis. A gap due more, for the EXCOMM tapes, to a decrease in the words of power than to an 
increase in those of intimacy [for affiliation, R² = .09, F(1, 30) = 2.81, ns, for power, R² = .17, 
F(1, 30) = 6.2, p < .05]. Put differently, the motive at work may have been more a restraint in 
displaying one‟s power than a need to express one‟s love for one‟s counterpart. Also, the 
thawing tension often breaks off, as for example in unit 23 of Robert Kennedy‟s memoir, when 
President Kennedy decides to increase the pressure, feeling that direct confrontation was 
unavoidable (Figure 2). Other high values in Figure 2 mark moments of tension among the 
President‟s team. Thus (Kennedy, 1969) in unit 5, “He [Secretary McNamara] argued that it [the 
blockade] was limited pressure, which could be increased as the circumstances warranted. (…) 
Those who argued for the military strike instead of a blockade pointed out that a blockade would 
not in fact remove the missiles and would not even stop the work from going ahead on the missile 
sites themselves (p.34). (...) The photography having indicated that the missiles were being 
directed at certain American cities, the estimate was that within a few minutes of their being 
fired eighty million Americans would be dead” (p. 35). Power concerns weigh heavily too in unit 
11 that is about gathering support from the “Organization of the American States” and European 
nations, while simultaneously putting U.S. troops on maximum alert. Yet, if the final 
confrontation was avoided, one sees that, from the beginning of the crisis, the EXCOMM 
members favored a strategy of graduated reduction of tensions (Hall, 1973; Osgood, 1962, pp. 
54-55) over an invasion of Cuba and a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.  
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
There is no significant change in the conflict indicator of the “Thirteen Days” film script. 
That indicator becomes only significant when we analyze separately talks and settings. Talks and 
settings follow their own trends, quadratic for the talks (inverted U, not shown) [R² = .60, F(2, 
10) = 7.5, p < .01], and cubic for the settings (U-shaped followed by a lower inverted U, not 
shown) [R² = .56, F(3, 9) = 3.8, p < .05]. The talks-settings correlation is .20 (N = 13, ns). The 
average value of the conflict indicator for talks is -.02, 2.3 for settings. The uncertainty intervals 
are large but never include zero, except for the quadratic (confidence intervals -.02 to .90) and 
cubic (confidence intervals -.04 to .003) components of the settings. We estimated and graphed 
the trend of the distance between talks and settings in the film script [R² = .55, F(2, 10) = 6.0, p < 
.05] (Figure 3). That talks and settings are out of sync is a feature likely to create dramatic 
tension in the film, a direct effect of the voice over. Tension, the difference between talks and 
settings, is higher at the beginning and end of the script and lower in the middle. This means that, 
say, for the first days and the last days of the crisis, spectators hear words of conciliation and at 
the same time watch visual details of military preparations. While the text is sequential, the film 
and the film script enjoy a certain degree of ubiquity, like a pictorial anacoluthon. As when 
American Ambassador to the United Nations Stevenson confronts Soviet Ambassador Zorin with 
the evidence of the missiles in Cuba while the camera pans over a US destroyer opening warning 
fires at the Soviet tanker Groznyy (Figure 3, day 25, October 1962). It wasn‟t war, but war‟s next 
stop, frightening as the step you miss as you fall asleep. 
 On comparing the script and the tapes, the film script of “Thirteen Days” runs 
uninterrupted from October 16 through 28 while the tapes contain no records for October 17, 21 
and 28. Script and tapes correlate only -.24 (n = 10, ns) on the conflict indicator. Indeed, the 
most risky day (about the risk of war) is October 22 in the script (not shown), but October 20 
(day 4) in the tapes. The least risky day is October 19 in the script, but October 27 (day 10) in the 
tapes. The average value of the risk of conflict is 1.1 in the script (talks and settings together), 
and -.5 in the tapes (difference 1.6, n = 10). Here we want to ask if these two mean values are 
different from each other. The t value is 2.96 (p<. 05). After 20,000 resamplings, the t value is 
4.1 (95% ci .8 to 13.2) and the mean difference is 1.57 (95% ci .52 to 2.5). The film script is 
more insistent on the risk of conflict than the tapes. 
Do the tapes, memoir, or script offer some moral lesson on the October 1962 events? As 
expected, the EXCOMM tapes contain the lowest rate of conceptual thought contents (mean = 
4.1, SD = .9) against the memoir (mean = 8.7, SD = .6) and the film script (mean = 7.8, SD = 
1.2). Robert Kennedy may have been tempted to translate for his readers a happier life than the 
one his characters lived during the thirteen days of the crisis while also building for his readers a 
future in which such a crisis would not happen anymore. Anyway, if pure archives like the 
EXCOMM tapes end the Cuban accounts, the memoir and the film settle them. Besides, the film 
shows the heritage of residual fear left at the end (Figure 3), which Robert Kennedy memoir does 
hardly (Figure 2). 
 
Discussion 
This paper is about the fetish of archives. All in all, disciplining textual studies should 
produce more credible information, which benefits the field. For this study to bear credible 
information, we needed arguments to support our point and texts specially chosen to confirm it. 
Tapes, memoir and script of the Cuban crisis covering the same event allowed us to assess the 
difference between views from nowhere about a past event and the view of a film-maker 
expressing a presentiment, in retrospect of time to come. While the tapes and the memoir carry 
the mark of a genuine endeavor to find a peaceful solution to a conflict, the script tilts arrestingly 
on “the brink of war”. Script and film succeed in rewriting the events without restrictions and in 
manipulating the tension, at the price of a wide of the mark account of the archives or the 
memoir. One could complain that we did not collect comparable data such as, say, archives of 
the Six-Day War of June 5-10, 1967 opposed to memories or autobiographies of that war. More 
data might just have obscured the idea. We thought it more fruitful to narrow down what bears 
the difference between the reality of an event and what people surmise of it. On this point, we 
receive support from Toulmin (1982, p. 95), opting for providing answers to pre-existing 
questions over generalizing from pre-existing facts. In his own realm, Spence (1982) gave 
evidence that therapist‟s notes are often richer than objective transcripts. Partially immune from 
spoil, stern transcripts cannot translate unspoken emotions, invisible tensions, or significant 
bodily movements. The therapist takes note of nonverbal events, as the novelist reenacts them 
and fully acts on them in the story. It is as if only fiction or imagination could do justice to a 3-D 
reality and allow it to become history. What the film of the Cuban Missile Crisis does is to 
naturalize (Culler, 1975) documentary archives. It makes us suspect the Cuban events had left 
shards of memory (Garagozov, 2006; Wertsch, 2002) which the many proxy wars later 
confirmed. What is it then we knew about archives and what else is there to grab for texts 
analysts? Pure objective archives yield accurate information, yet one that is less prescient than 
story data. The Cuban film data show the possibility of a renewed risk of war, while that 
information is absent from both the tapes and the memoir. Story data may further carry some 
degree of moral awareness: The Cuban story data (the memoir and especially the film) carry an 
ethical message (high degree of abstract thought) that is now part of the history of fear. Wounds 
of the soul do not heal as those of the body, wrote Lawrence in Lady Chaterley’s Lover (1946, p. 
43):  
“And when we think we have recovered and forgotten, it is then that the 
terrible after-effects have to be encountered at their worst”. 
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Footnotes 
     
1
 The list of corpuses used to validate the versions of the motive imagery dictionary is 
available at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/7552029/Corpus%20of%20War%20and%20Peace.pdf  
     
2
 The subcategories of the RID are available at http://textanalysis.info/pages/category-
systems/general-category-systems/regressive-imagery-dictionary.php  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Cuban Missile Crisis: The indicator of risk of conflict assessed from “The EXCOMM 
Tapes” transcripts (October 16 to 29, 1962). 
Figure 2. Cuban Missile Crisis: The indicator of risk of conflict assessed from Robert F. 
Kennedy’s memoir “Thirteen days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis". 
Figure 3. Cuban Missile Crisis: The distance between the indicators of risk of conflict in the 
settings and the talks of the “Thirteen Days” film script (October 16 to 28, 1962). 
  
Figure
Click here to download Figure: fetish_figures.docx 
  
 
Figure 1. Cuban Missile Crisis: The indicator of risk of conflict assessed from “The EXCOMM 
Tapes” transcripts (October 16 to 29, 1962). 
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Figure 2. Cuban Missile Crisis: The indicator of risk of conflict assessed from Robert F. 
Kennedy’s memoir “Thirteen days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis".  
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Figure 3. Cuban Missile Crisis: The distance between the indicators of risk of conflict in the 
settings and the talks of the “Thirteen Days” film script (October 16 to 28, 1962). 
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Table 1.  
The corpus 
Texts Divisions Total N. of 
words 
 
N. different words 
“The Kennedy 
Tapes”: The 
EXCOMM 
meetings 
11 days between 
Tuesday Oct. 16 – 
Monday Oct. 29, 
1962 
 
200,543 7,081 
“Thirteen Days: 
A Memoir of the 
Cuban Missile 
Crisis” 
 
13 days (16-28 Oct. 
1962) divided into 32 
arbitrary segments of 
513 words each. 
16,420 2,553 
“Thirteen Days” 
(script) 
Tuesday Oct. 16 – 
Sunday Oct. 28, 1962 
- by settings: 
- by talks: 
29,723 
 
15,524 
14,199 
4,344 
 
3,038 
2,274 
  
table
Click here to download table: fetish_tables.docx 
Table 2.  
Affiliation and Power categories of the motive dictionary (V 6.0, March 28, 2009) 
Category Subcategory N. of entries Examples 
Affiliation  843  
 Affection 105 mate, sweetheart 
 Social behavior 87 answer, escort 
 Affiliation 473 accompany, courteous 
 Affect loss 34 alone, indifference 
 Affect participants 61 dad, mistress 
 Affect words 41 family, nostalgic 
 Positive affect 43 affable, thoughtful 
Power  1,769  
 Power 984 ambition, justice 
 Power gain 48 emancipate, nominate 
 Power loss 65 captive, weak 
 Power ends 12 plead, recommend 
 Power conflicts 269 adversary, invade 
 Power cooperation 68 arbiter, reciprocal 
 Power authoritative 
participants 
99 patriarch, detective 
 Power ordinary participant 28 emissary, orator 
 Power doctrine 27 conservatism, dogma 
 Power authority 36  legitimate, reign 
 Residual power words 133 colonialism, terrorize 
Table 3.  
Number and percentage of entries in the three versions of the motive dictionary (American-
English, ae; Belgian-French, bf; Spanish-Spain, sp). 
 
 nAch (%)* nAff (%) nPow (%) version 
ae 1386 (34.7) 843 (21.1) 1769 (44.2) 6.0, 2012 
bf 1012 (31.8) 644 (20.2)  1528 (48.0) 1.3, 2010 
sp 1624 (38.8) 682 (16.3) 1881 (44.9) 1.1, 2009 
 
* Not in use in this study 
  
Table 4. Summary of statistical results, ci 20,000 resamplings 
 R² df F p lin /                   
quad 
95 % 
Tapes  
Conflict indicator .42 1,9 6.5 <.05 x -.45/-.09 lin 
Memoir  
Conflict indicator .24 1,30 9.4 <.005 x -.09/-.03 lin 
Script  
Conflict indicator 
for talks 
.60 2,10 7.5 <.01 x 
            x 
.39/1.81 lin 
-.13/-.03 quad 
Conflict indicator 
for settings 
.56 3,9 3.8 <.05 x      
              
-6.5/-.14 lin 
(-.02/.90 quad) 
(-.04/.003 cub) 
Distance “talks-
settings” 
.55 2, 10 6.0 <.05 x 
            x 
-2.1/-.62 lin 
.03/.16 quad 
 
  
 Table 5. Cuban Missile Crisis: Two by two comparisons of the average rates of 
conceptual thought (Martindale’ Regressive Imagery Dictionary) in the memoir, 
the script (talks only), and the tapes (October 16-29, 1962)  
 memoir/tapes tapes/script memoir/script 
n             32        11       11          13     32            13 
mean            8.7       4.1                4.1        7.8     8.7          7.8 
SD              .6         .9         .9        1.2       .6          1.2 
difference 4.6 -3.7 .9 
t 15.9 -8.7 2.6 
df 41 22 43 
p <.0001 <.0001 <.02 
t (20,000)* 17.6 -9.2 2.8 
95% ci ** 10.1/28.7 6.4/13.2 .63/5.8 
 
* t value after 20,000 resamplings  
** 95% confidence interval after 20,000 resamplings 
